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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Industrial Commission entered its order on May 23, 
1988 denying Petitioner-Defendants1 Motion for Review. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-86 (Supp. 1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge committed 
legal error in his decision, 
(a) Whether there is sufficient factual founda-
tion in the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's 
findings; 
(b) Whether the Administrative Law Judge's deci-
sion was based upon unreasonable inferences; 
(c) Whether the Administrative Law Judge complied 
with Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46a-10(l)(a)f requiring that the 
order of a presiding officer must include findings of fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative pro-
ceedings or on facts sufficiently noted; and 
(d) Whether the claimant met her burden of proof 
by showing medical causation as required by Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
2. Whether the Administrative Law Judge demonstrated 
extreme bias during the hearing, therefore mandating a new 
hearing. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 13, 1982 respondent Marie T. Mabbutt filed a 
claim for dependent's benefits and/or burial benefits with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. A hearing was held on May 8, 1984 
before Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge, Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, and the matter thereafter was referred by Judge 
Sohm on May 23, 1984 to a medical panel. 
The ALJ awarded benefits, but on December 31, 1986, the 
Utah Supreme Court remanded this action back to the Industrial 
Commission for additional findings of fact in Price River Coal 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986). The 
Supreme Court found that the Commission had to determine, if pos-
sible, the nature of Fred C. Mabbutt's activities in the mine on 
the day of his death. The ALJ made his tentative findings on or 
about July 8, 1987, and referred the same to the medical panel 
for its further evaluation. The medical panel filed its supple-
mental report on September 1, 1987. The ALJ filed his final 
Order Upon Remand on February 24, 1988 awarding benefits to 
respondent Marie T. Mabbutt. 
On March 7, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Review 
objecting to the ALJ's finding that both legal and medical causa-
tion had been established, as required by Allen v. Industrial 
Commission 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). On March 10, 1988, respon-
dent Marie T. Mabbutt filed a Cross-Motion for Review arguing 
that the ALJ should have awarded attorneys' fees in addition to 
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benefits awarded as opposed to out of respondent's award and that 
the fee should have been calculated based on a percentage of more 
than just the first six years of benefits plus any interest 
awarded* On May 23, 1988, the Industrial Commission denied peti-
tioners' Motion for Review and with respect to respondent's 
Motion for Cross-Review, the Commission found that the Adminis-
trative Law Judge correctly calculated the fee to be paid to 
respondent's counsel, but since there was no final resolution of 
the attorneys' fees issued first raised in Harrison v. Olympic 
Oil Inc., Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 880279, Industrial Com-
mission Case No. 86000733, the Commission chose to reserve deci-
sion on the attorneys' fees question. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Fred C. Mabbutt ("Mr. Mabbutt") was found dead on 
October 23, 1981 at the end of his eight hour shift as a belt 
attendant in the No. 3 coal mine of petitioner Price River Coal 
Company ("PRC") located in Helper, Utah. 
As a belt attendant, Mr. Mabbutt generally worked alone 
and without supervision. The principal duties of his job were to 
clean and rockdust the area around the No. 5 beltdrive and the 
No. 4 tailpiece which involved some shoveling and the use of a 
one-inch water hose to dilute the slurry to a density that 
enables it to be picked up by the flyte pump which pushes water 
and coal fines onto the beltline. 
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Mr. Mabbutt did not go to work on October 22, 1981, the 
day before he died, due to the onset the night before of nausea 
and what Mr. Mabbutt and his wife diagnosed as an "upset stom-
ach." However, Mrs. Mabbutt reported that Mr. Mabbutt seemed 
fine when he left for work on October 23, 1981. Mr. Mabbutt's 
workshift on October 23, 1981 was from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 
with 30 minutes for lunch sometime between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 
noon. 
The record is silent with respect to what activities 
Mr. Mabbutt performed prior to 11:15 on the day he died. Gene 
Miller, a fellow belt inspector, was with Mr. Mabbutt in 
Mabbuttfs working area from 11:15 a.m. until approximately 12:00 
noon during which time Mr. Mabbutt did no shoveling activities 
but worked the entire time with the waterhose trying to get the 
pump unplugged. Miller testified at a hearing that the hose work 
being done by Mr. Mabbutt during those 45 minutes does not 
require any particular effort of any kind. Miller, upon 
cross-examination, recalled having told general foreman Paul 
Tempfer that Mr. Mabbutt "seemed okay to me" during the period of 
time between 11:15 and 12:00 noon when the two men were together. 
(See. Miller's testimony, p. 57, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
The next reported contact with Mr. Mabbutt was a tele-
phone call from Miller to Mabbutt at approximately 1:15 p.m. 
Miller called Mr. Mabbutt to find out whether Mabbutt was respon-
sible for some of the mine belts no longer being operable. 
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According to Miller, Mr. Mabbutt merely stated that "it wasn't 
him" who was responsible for the belts being down, with no indi-
cation that Mabbutt was either ill, upset or agitated at that 
time. (See, Miller's testimony, p. 54, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that 
anyone spent any time with or even observed Mr. Mabbutt between 
12:00 p.m. when Miller left Mr. Mabbutt's working area and 4:29 
p.m. when Hicks searched the working area and found decedent 
lying face up with the one-inch water hose still in his hand, 
squirting water across his body. (See, Hicks' testimony, p. 
79-80, May 8, 1984 transcript.) However, it was reported at the 
investigation of Mr. Mabbutt's death that the shift foreman, Bob 
Lindsay, had called Mr. Mabbutt at approximately 2:00 p.m. to 
remind him of the rock dusting which was to be done toward the 
end of the shift. Mr. Mabbutt gave no indication to Mr. Lindsay 
that he was experiencing any difficulty in performing his work 
duties. 
Hicks, upon discovering Mr. Mabbutt as described above, 
immediately placed a telephone call on the mine telephone for 
assistance. An autopsy was performed at 8:45 a.m. on October 24, 
1981, and the autopsy report states that Mr. Mabbutt died of cor-
onary insufficiency due to advanced narrowing of the coronary 
arteries (heart attack). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge's decision was based on 
inferences and findings of fact which were neither reasonable nor 
supported by substantial evidence. The record contains clear 
evidence of a worker who had a pre-existing high-risk cardiac 
condition and no evidence with which to reasonably infer that Mr. 
Mabbutt engaged in unusual exertion which resulted in his death. 
The record points out that sudden cardiac death, the cause of Mr. 
Mabbuttfs death, can strike at any time, even when a potential 
victim is at rest. 
During the hearings, the ALJ demonstrated extreme bias 
and the ALJ did not comply with the applicable provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act which require that the presid-
ing officer's findings of fact must be based exclusively on the 
"evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or in fact 
sufficiently noted." Additionally, the order of the ALJ did not 
comply with the standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission nor has respondent met her burden 
of proof under the medical causation test of Allen. 
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ARGUMENT 
Z. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WILL NOT UPHOLD 
FINDINGS AND ORDERS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION IF THEY ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In reviewing a decision by the Commission, "[t]his 
Court will not disturb the findings and orders of the Commission 
unless they are arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary 
and capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or without 
any reasonable basis in the evidence." American Roofing Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) citing 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). In the 
instant case, the findings of the ALJ are without any reasonable 
basis in the evidence (see. Section II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 -
16) and are actually contrary to the evidence presented. (See, 
Section II.B. of this Brief, pp. 16 - 21.) 
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION IS 
BASED UPON IMPROPER FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In his February 24, 1988 Order, Administrative Law 
Judge Timothy C. Allen made a series of findings of fact that 
clearly were without any reasonable basis in the evidence pre-
sented at the hearings. Additionally, he did not make a number 
of findings that are both supported by substantial evidence and 
necessary for a fair resolution of this case. 
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A. The Findings of Fact Made By the Administrative Law 
Judge in his February 24, 1988 Order Are Based on 
Unreasonable Inferences and Are Not Supported by the 
Evidence. 
It is well-settled that any decision of the Industrial 
Commission must be supported by substantial evidence. Kennecott 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 675 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). Where 
no direct evidence on an element material to the case is availa-
ble in the record, reasonable inferences may be made from circum-
stantial evidence. A reasonable inference is a conclusion 
arrived at by a process of reasoning. The conclusion must be a 
rational and logical deduction from facts which are actually 
established by the evidence, when those facts are viewed in the 
light of common experience. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the ALJ went far beyond the bounds 
of the law in making his findings. Some findings are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, while others are not based on 
reasonable inferences from the few circumstantial facts which are 
established in the record. 
1. The ALJ found that Mr. Mabbutt had "no success" 
trying to lift the 110 pound pump out of the sump. 
Rather, Miller admitted in his testimony that he did 
not see whether Mr. Mabbutt was actually successful in pulling 
the pump out of the muck. (See, Miller's testimony, p. 52, 
May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
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2. The ALJ found that Miller "observed that the coal 
fines and muck had spilled over the block dam. . . •" 
Rather, Miller testified that it was a sump area, not a 
spill. (See, Miller's testimony, p. 36, July 7, 1987 
transcript.) 
Additionally, John O'Green, the Director of Safety at 
PRC at the time of Mr. Mabbutt's death, testified that when the 
sump pump is operative it can easily handle any accumulation of 
fines that are gathered in the sump area. The following exchange 
took place at the July 7, 1987 hearing: 
Q. Mr. O'Green, it's my understanding - and 
I think you've testified in one of the ear-
lier hearings — that the sump pump when it 
is operative can easily handle any accumula-
tion of fines that's gathered down in that 
area; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that frequently the belt attendants 
will utilize the hoses so that they can avoid 
shoveling and carrying in the buckets by vir-
tue of using the sump to do the work for 
them; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now assuming that you have the buildup 
even as described by Mr. Miller a few moments 
ago, if that sump pump is operating, how long 
would you anticipate it would take to get rid 
of the buildup in that location? 
A. Not very long at all. Maybe between 30 
minutes and an hour. 
Q. Now my recollection of the testimony was 
that the sump was working again at the time 
they found Mr. Mabbutt's body. 
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A. That's true. 
Q. And there was — The buildup had been 
entirely eliminated? 
A. Not entirely eliminated — 
Q. I mean there was some — 
A. — there was some. 
Q. — small amount? 
A. Nothing of any real significance. 
O'Green's testimony, pp. 71-72, July 7, 1987 transcript. 
3. The ALJ found that Miller "observed that Mr. 
Mabbutt had made four trips from the sump area to the No. 4 
belt." 
Rather, Miller testified that although he observed Mr. 
Mabbutt make several trips from the sump area to the number 4 
belt, he couldn't say exactly how many. (See, Miller's testi-
mony, p. 33, July 7, 1987 transcript.) 
4. The ALJ found that "[t]he accumulations from the 
belt were also mounting, since Mr. Mabbutt was not shoveling coal 
fines from beneath the rollers or in the vicinity of the drive 
unit." 
Rather, there was testimony that there was not an unu-
sual accumulation of materials. (See, O'Green's testimony, p. 
41f October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
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5. The ALJ found that Mr. Mabbutt "continued shovel-
ing and carrying buckets of muck to the #4 belt, and continually 
was engaged in these activities until his unfortunate demise." 
This is pure speculation on the part of the ALJ and is 
not a reasonable inference. No one saw Mr. Mabbutt from 12:00 
noon until he was found at 4:29 p.m. and during the telephone 
conversation that Miller had with Mr. Mabbutt at 1:15 p.m., and 
the later telephone call with foreman Bob Lindsay at approxi-
mately 2:00 p.m., Mr. Mabbutt did not report that anything was 
wrong. (See, Miller's testimony, p. 54, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
O'Green testified that the sump pump was working at the time Mr. 
Mabbutt's body was found and that the pump could have alleviated 
a buildup of materials in the sump area in approximately 30 min-
utes to an hour. (See, O'Green's testimony, pp. 71-72, July 7, 
1987 transcript). Therefore, no one knows whether Mr. Mabbutt 
was continually engaged in shoveling and carrying buckets of muck 
to the No. 4 belt. Since the sump pump was found in an operable 
condition when Mr. Mabbutt's body was found, there is no reason 
not to infer that he used it to remove the coal fines. It is 
totally illogical to infer that a man, ill the day before and 
obese, would prefer to carry 100 buckets of muck and lift them 
onto a belt, rather than merely flip the switch of a pump to 
clean his work area. 
6. The ALJ found that Mr. Mabbutt "felt that he was 
under some pressure to keep that area of the mine clean." 
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Again, this is speculation by the ALJ. Although Dr. 
Perry testified that Mr. Mabbutt may have had the anxiety of 
being behind and Joy Huitt testified that it was important to 
keep the belt line area clean (see. Perry's testimony, p. 15, 
October 24, 1984 transcript; Huitt's testimony, pp. 12-13, July 
7, 1987 transcript), there was testimony that there was not an 
unusual accumulation of materials. (See. O'Green's testimony, 
p. 41, October 24, 1984 transcript.) O'Green also testified that 
the material in the block water dam was not nearing a point where 
an overflow of material might possibly occur. Therefore, it was 
not critical for Mr. Mabbutt to remove the material at that point 
in time. Additionally, even assuming arguendo that it became 
critical, Mr. Mabbutt could have used the sump pump to get caught 
up. (See. O'Green's testimony, pp. 71-72, July 7, 1987 
transcript). 
7. The ALJ found that Mr. Mabbutt's "work activities 
on October 23, 1981, involved unusual exertion" and that "[t]he 
work activities of Fred C. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981 . . . 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in every day life because of his condition." 
1
 The ALJ's February 28, 1988 Order actually states that 
Mabbutt's activities "involved usual exertion." When viewed in 
light of the remainder of the ALJ's Order, this clearly must be a 
typographical error and the ALJ must have meant to use the word 
unusual, rather than usual. 
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In support for his conclusion that Mr. Mabbuttfs work 
activities on the day of his death involved unusual exertion, the 
ALJ relies exclusively on the testimony of Mr. Miller, from which 
the ALJ concludes that Mr. Mabbutt moved 100 buckets of muck to 
clean out his area of the belt. However, in his Order the ALJ 
admits that some doubt exists as to the exact activities of Mr. 
Mabbutt on the day of his death. While doubts are resolved in 
favor of a claimant, they cannot be so resolved without evidence 
in the record to support even the finding most favorable to the 
claimant. (See, Section I. and II.A. of this Brief, pp. 7-16.) 
Regarding the 100 buckets of muck figure, the following 
testimony was given during the July 7, 1987 hearing: 
Q. Mr. Miller, when you estimate these 100 
buckets, you're just making a guess, aren't 
you? You haven't computed the volume of 
these buckets, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you haven't computed the volume of 
that sump area, have you? 
A. No. 
Miller's testimony, p. 42, July 7, 1987 transcript. 
By relying on Miller's speculation that the sump area 
contained a volume of muck that would fill 100 buckets, the ALJ 
actually relies on speculation in order to speculate himself as 
to what Mr. Mabbutt's activities were on the day of his death. 
Thus, the findings of fact on this subject by the ALJ are clearly 
unsupported by evidence. 
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Dr. Yanowitzf an expert in the field of cardiovascular 
disease and a witness called as an expert by the claimant, testi-
fied that in terms of causing Mr. Mabbutt's sudden cardiac death, 
the most significant events were the most recent, or as Dr. 
Yanowitz said, those occurring within 20, 30, or 40 minutes of 
Mabbutt's death. (See, Dr. Yanowitz1s testimony, p. 124, May 8, 
1984 transcript.) Additionally, the testimony supports a conclu-
sion that when Mabbutt's body was found at approximately 4:29 
p.m., the drive was partially cleaned down to the surface. (See, 
Evelyn Hicks' testimony, p. 90, May 8, 1984 transcript.) (Ms. 
Hicks was a belt attendant at PRC at the time of Mr. Mabbutt's 
death.) We also know from 0'Green's testimony that if the belts 
had been shut off at 2:00 p.m. and if the belts were not moving 
at 2:00 p.m., they may indeed have been cleaned by 2:00 p.m. 
since coal does not fall from the belt when the belt is not in 
operation. (See, O'Green's testimony, p. 53, October 24, 1984 
transcript.) 
Thus, it is clear why the ALJ's inference is not rea-
sonable. A reasonable person would be compelled to believe the 
medical testimony that the critical time period of activity was 
from approximately 40 minutes before Mr. Mabbutt died to his 
final moment. There were no eyewitnesses to the fact, nor can we 
logically or reasonably deduce that Mr. Mabbutt was participating 
in unusual job-related exertion in the 40 minutes prior to his 
death. Indeed, there is no evidence that he engaged in unusual 
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exertion at any time during his shift. Miller last saw Mr. 
Mabbutt at 12:00 noon; Mabbutt talked on the telephone at 1:15 
p.m. and 2:00 p.m. The activities last witnessed by Miller 
occurred well before Mr. Mabbutt's death. 
Rather, there is uncontradicted evidence that Mabbutt 
was found using a waterhose that was still spouting water. 
Spraying a waterhose represents the type of activity that Mr. 
Mabbutt would engage in during his everyday life. Additionally, 
O1 Green testified that the area where Mr. Mabbutt was found was 
not an area where Mr. Mabbutt could have been shoveling muck onto 
the belt. (See, O'Green's testimony, p. 60, October 24, 1984 
transcript.) O'Green also testified that the material in the 
block water dam was not nearing a point where an overflow of 
material might possibly occur. Therefore, it was not critical 
for Mr. Mabbutt to remove the material at that point in time. 
(See, O'Green's testimony, pp. 61-62, October 24, 1984 tran-
script.) These facts, in light of his medical history as a prime 
candidate for sudden cardiac death, precludes the drawing of a 
reasonable inference that Mabbutt's death was job-related. 
The ALJ's findings represent a "leap of faith" from 
what was to what might have been. The facts in the record tell 
an incomplete story and the Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
that story was not complete enough to entitle petitioner to bene-
fits when it remanded this case back to the Industrial Commission 
for additional findings of fact. After the hearing on remand, no 
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additional direct evidence was presented to fill in the gaps as 
to Mr. Mabbutt's activities on the day of his death. The ALJf 
howeverf must have felt inclined at all costs to make an award of 
benefits in this case and thus filled the gaps in the record with 
unreasonable inferences. The ALJ should have filled in the gaps 
by drawing reasonable inferences from the wealth of testimony as 
discussed in the following section. To have done so would have 
resulted in a realization that respondent has not sustained her 
burden of proof. 
B. The Administrative Law Judge Should Have, But Did Not 
Make the Following Reasonable Inferences or Formulate 
the Following Findings of Fact. 
1. Mr. Mabbutt was a prime candidate for sudden car-
diac death. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 90, October 24, 
1984 transcript; Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 67f October 24, 1984 
transcript.) 
(a) Mr. Mabbutt weighed over 200 pounds at the 
time of his death. (See, Marie Mabbutt's testimony, p. 20, 
May 8, 1984 transcript; Dr. Perry's testimony, p. 14, October 24, 
1984 transcript.) (Dr. Perry testified that Mabbutt was obese and 
that obesity plays a role in the development of coronary artery 
disease and the development of fatal arrhythmias.) 
(b) Mr. Mabbutt was suffering from atherosclero-
tic cardiovascular disease and there were a number of items in 
his medical record going back to the late 1960's when he was hos-
pitalized a number of times for kidney stones, that at least 
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indicate that he was at significant risk for developing manifes-
tations of atherosclerotic heart disease. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's 
testimony, p. 102, May 8, 1984 transcript; Dr. Perryfs testimony, 
p. 14, October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(c) Mr. Mabbutt was treated for hypertension, 
which is a major risk factor for atherosclerosis. (See, Dr. 
Yanowitz's testimony, p. 102, May 8, 1984 transcript; Dr. Fowles' 
testimony, p. 67, October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(d) Mr. Mabbutt had diabetes mellitus, which was 
diagnosed in 1975 and is also a major risk factor for 
atherosclerosis. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 102, May 8, 
1984 transcript; Dr. Perry's testimony, p. 14, October 24, 1984 
transcript; Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 67, October 24, 1984 
transcript.) 
(e) Mr. Mabbutt had evidence of gout, also a risk 
factor for atherosclerosis. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 
102, May 8, 1984 transcript; Dr. Perry's testimony, p. 14, 
October 24, 1984 transcript; Dr. Fowles1 testimony, p. 67, 
October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(f) Mr. Mabbutt had levels of blood cholesterol 
which were above normal. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, pp. 
102-103, May 8, 1984 transcript; Dr. Fowles1 testimony, p. 67, 
October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
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(g) Mr. Mabbutt was at risk for cardiovascular 
disease. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 103, May 8, 1984 
transcript.) 
(h) One of Mr. Mabbutt*s chest x-rays taken in 
1973 was read as cardiomegaly, suggesting that he had an enlarged 
heart, albeit perhaps mild, suggesting that he was at risk for a 
heart attack or some other manifestation of coronary disease. 
(See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 103, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
2. Mr. Mabbutt died from a cardiac rhythm disturbance 
such as ventricular fibrillation, i.e., sudden cardiac death. 
(See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 108, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
3. Fibrillation can occur with or without activity 
and a person can develop a ventricular fibrillation at rest. 
(See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 110, May 8, 1984 transcript; 
Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 67, October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(a) Stresses that trigger sudden cardiac death 
can be, and are often, engendered at home, e.g., watching a foot-
ball game on television. (See, Dr. Perry's testimony, pp. 19, 
27, October 24, 1984 transcript; Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 90, 
October 24, 1984 transcript; Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 68, 
October 24, 1984 transcript.) Sudden cardiac death can even 
occur during sleep. (See, Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 70, 
October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
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(b) The job of belt attendant is one of the least 
strenuous jobs inside the mine. (See, 0'Green's testimony, 
p. 38, October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(c) When the belt system is not operating, there 
is no coal falling off the belt and there is no other material 
accumulating in the belt attendant's area. (See, O'Green's tes-
timony, p. 62, October 24, 1984 transcript.) 
(d) The activities that Mr. Mabbutt was doing at 
the time of his fatal cardiac arrhythmias were likely associated 
with his arrhythmic event. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 
125, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
(e) Within a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, the events that were most significant in terms of causing 
Mr. Mabbutt's sudden cardiac death were the most recent events, 
those occurring within 20, 30, or 40 minutes of his death. (See, 
Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 124, May 8, 1984 transcript.) 
(f) The most likely precipitating factors for the 
cardiac arrhythmia were the events immediately preceding Mr. 
Mabbutt's death. (See, Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 125, May 8, 
1984 transcript.) 
(g) Shoveling muck into buckets, carrying buck-
ets, lifting buckets and standing with a waterhose requires no 
more energy than other usual activities of a normal person during 
his everyday life, such as carrying luggage, carrying garbage 
cans to the street, mowing a lawn or playing with children. 
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(See, Dr. Bloswick's testimony, pp. 96, 100, 120, July 7, 1987 
transcript). 
It is apparent from the above detailed testimony that 
the ALJ's decision is based on improper findings of fact. This 
is true not only because the findings of fact made by the ALJ in 
his order are based on unreasonable inferences, but also because 
the ALJ did not formulate findings of fact that were clearly sup-
ported by the record. The findings of fact that the ALJ should 
have formulated, but did not, paint a picture of an employee who 
was a prime candidate for sudden cardiac death, which is pre-
cisely how he died. Mr. Mabbutt was overweight, suffered from 
diabetes mellitus, hypertension, high blood cholesterol, an 
enlarged heart, and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. He 
had one of the least strenuous jobs inside the mine and there is 
no evidence that he was engaged in strenuous activity at the time 
of his death. The record clearly states that sudden cardiac 
death can strike a person not engaged in any activity and a per-
son can develop a ventricular fibrillation, i.e. sudden cardiac 
death, while fully at rest. Given these facts, the ALJ should 
have found that Mr. Mabbuttfs death was not job-related. 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DEMONSTRATED 
EXTREME BIAS DURING THE HEARING AND THEREFORE 
HIS DECISION IS TAINTED. 
During the testimony of Dr. Bloswick, an expert in 
ergonomics and occupational biomechanics (the relationship of man 
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to his work environment), the Administrative Law Judge inter-
rupted and stated in a haughty and argumentative manner: "I find 
that hard to believe." (See, Dr. Bloswick's testimony, p. 103, 
July 7, 1987 transcript.) This comment demonstrated a complete 
lack of open-mindedness on the part of the ALJ. Additionally, 
the comment demonstrates the ALJ's bias against petitioners' 
argument and is evidence that the ALJ did not fully consider 
petitioners' case in its entirety. 
The ALJ's bias is also demonstrated by the fact that 
the ALJ did not even mention the testimony of Dr. Bloswick or the 
testimony of the company's safety expert, John 0'Green, in his 
February 24, 1988 decision. Additionally, the ALJ did not even 
acknowledge that Dr. Bloswick had appeared as an expert witness. 
Wholly apart from statute or rule, an administrative hearing 
officer may be disqualified by a showing of actual bias or 
prejudice. Larson v. Industrial Commission, 559 P.2d 1070, 1072 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). In the instant case, the ALJ exhibited 
actual bias against petitioners and should have been disquali-
fied. The ALJ's decision, based on the evidence at the hearing 
should not be upheld by this Court or at the very least, this 
Court should remand the case for a new hearing. 
-21-
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACTr ENACTED AT UTAH 
CODE ANN.. TITLE 63f CHAPTER 46B. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah is an agency governed 
by the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
the Administrative Law Judge's February 24, 1988 Order does not 
comply with the provisions of that Act. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-lQ(l)(a) (Supp. 
1988), the Order of a presiding officer (Administrative Law 
Judge), must include a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the "evidence of record in 
the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted." It 
is clear that the findings of fact of the ALJ are based on many 
inferences that cannot reasonably be drawn from the evidence 
presented and the facts officially noted in the instant case. 
For example, the ALJ found that accumulations from the 
mine belt were mounting and that Mr. Mabbutt was continually 
engaged in shoveling and carrying buckets of muck until his 
death. These inferences are no more than pure speculation on the 
part of the ALJ and are not reasonable. In addition to a number 
of other unreasonable inferences, the ALJ found that Mr. 
Mabbutt's work activities on October 23, 1981 involved unusual 
exertion and contributed "something substantial" to increase the 
risk he has already faced in everyday life because of his condi-
tion. It is clear that these findings of fact and the findings 
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addressed in Section II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 - 16, are based 
on inferences that cannot reasonably be drawn from the evidence 
presented. Thus, the ALJ has not complied with the Utah Adminis-
trative Procedures Act in that he clearly did not base his 
findings of fact exclusively on the evidence of record in the 
proceedings or on facts officially noted, as required by the Act. 
(See, Section II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 - 16.) For this reason 
alone, the decision of the ALJ must be overturned. 
V. THE ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAS 
NOT MET THE STANDARD ARTICULATED IN ALLEN V. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the current test regarding 
the two prerequisites for finding a compensable injury under 
statutory law. The applicable statute reads: 
Every employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependants of 
every such employee who is killed, by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. . . shall be paid compensation 
for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (Supp. 1987). 
First, the statute requires that the injury must be by 
"accident". Second, the statute requires that there exists a 
causal connection between the injury and the employment. Under 
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the second prerequisite of the statute the Allen decision adopted 
a two-part test consisting of legal and medical causation. 
Under the first element of this two-part analysis 
(legal causation), the law must define what kind of exertion 
satisfies the test of "arising out of the employment." Under the 
second element (medical causation), a medical panel must deter-
mine whether the exertion, having been held legally sufficient to 
support compensation, in fact caused the injury. 
To meet the legal causation requirement under the 
analysis of Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition, such 
as Mr. Mabbutt, must demonstrate that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in 
everyday life because of his condition. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually 
supplied by an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal 
everyday life. Under the theories expounded in Allen, this extra 
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of the 
employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating 
claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. id. 
The Utah Supreme Court summarized this analysis: 
"Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition 
which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is 
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sufficient." id. at 26. In the instant case, it is absolutely 
uncontested that Mr. Mabbutt had a severe preexisting cardiac 
condition, and indeed, the Supreme Court so found in its deci-
sion. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 
1079 (Utah 1986). (See also, Section II.B. of this Brief, pp. 8 
- 16.) 
In determining whether the employee's exertion would be 
usual or ordinary in nonemployment life, an objective standard 
must be applied based on the nonemployment life of the average 
person, not the nonemployment life of the particular worker. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
The second part of the two-part test requires that the 
claimant medically prove that the disability is the result of an 
exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity. 
The purpose of the medical cause test is to insure that there is 
a medically demonstrable causal link between the work-related 
exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted from those 
strains. 
In Alien, the Utah Supreme Court opined, n[u]nder the 
medical cause test, the claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his 
or her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In 
the event the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, 
compensation must be denied." Id. at 27. 
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The Allen decision clearly places the burden of proving 
both legal and medical causation squarely upon the shoulders of 
the claimant* This burden has not been met in this case. 
Regarding medical causation in the instant case, the 
opinions of the medical panel relied upon the ALJ's findings of 
fact which were either not supported by substantial evidence or 
are not based on reasonable inferences from the few circumstan-
tial facts which are established in the record. (See, Section 
II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 - 16.) 
In the instant casef the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the Industrial Commission's finding that Mr. Mabbutt died "by 
accident" on October 23, 1981. Price River Coal Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986). However, the 
court's finding that Mr. Mabbutt's death was by accident did not 
answer the question of whether the resulting injury was compensa-
ble. The court remanded the instant case for determination by 
the Commission of (1) what Mr. Mabbutt's job related activities 
were on the day of his death and (2) whether those activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion, beyond the physi-
cal exertions of the nonemployment life of the average person. 
In determining that the Commission's findings of fact were 
insufficient in both regards to support the Commission's legal 
conclusion of a compensable injury, Justice Zimmerman wrote, 
Because the whole legal cause determina-
tion hinges upon the agency's findings as to 
what the injured worker's job-related activi-
ties were, our review of the Commission's 
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decision must begin with those findings. In 
the present case, we are unable to affirm the 
Commission's ruling because of the inadequacy 
of these findings. In his job, Mabbutt 
worked alone in the mine, and he encountered 
only one person while working on the day of 
his death. For that reason, it was necessary 
to infer what Mabbutt's activities were from 
the conflicting evidence adduced at the 
hearing before the administrative law judge. 
Id. at 1083. 
The ALJ's recent decision upon remand is no closer to 
discerning what Mr. Mabbutt's job related activities were on the 
day of his death than the ALJ's original decision. As explained 
in detail in Section II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 - 16, the ALJ's 
inferences in his February 24, 1988 Order are not reasonable. 
A reasonable inference is a conclusion arrived at by a 
process of reasoning. The conclusion must be a rational and 
logical deduction from facts admitted and established by the 
evidence, when those facts are viewed in the light of common 
experience. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The inferences drawn by the ALJ in the instant case are 
clearly not reasonable because they are not based on facts 
admitted and established by the evidence. 
As explained in Section II.A. of this Brief, pp. 8 -
16, Mr. Mabbutt did not have any contact with anyone from 2:00 
p.m. until he was found at 4:29 p.m. and therefore, no one knows 
whether Mr. Mabbutt was engaged in unusual exertion during that 
period of time or indeed even after 12:00, and no amount of 
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inferring from the evidence can lead to this conclusion. None of 
the witnesses knew and, therefore, the ALJ can at best only 
infer, what activities Mr. Mabbutt was engaged in. Additionally, 
as explained in Section III of this Brief, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 , the ALJ 
did not even mention Dr. Bloswick's testimony in his order. Dr. 
Bloswick's testimony clearly supports the position that the 
activities that Mr. Mabbutt engaged in on the day of his death 
required no more energy than the usual daily activities of a 
normal person. 
In sum, there are only a few operative facts in the 
instant case regarding Mr. Mabbutt's work day activities on the 
day in question: 
1. At 1:00 p.m., the belts were not 
operative. When the belts are not working 
inside the mine, there can be no further 
accumulation of coal fines or "muckrr. 
2. When Mr. Mabbutt was found at 4:29 
p.m., there was not an unusual accumulation 
of muck in the sump area. 
3. When Mr. Mabbutt was found at 4:29 
p.m., the pump was operative. 
4. If the pump is operative, the sump 
area can be cleaned out very quickly and 
there is no need for the belt operator to 
shovel muck onto the belt or into buckets. 
5. Although we know that Mr. Mabbutt 
shoveled some muck into buckets and carried 
those buckets to the belt sometime before 
12:00 noon, we have absolutely no idea 
whether he ever shoveled again during the 
remainder of that day. 
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The Industrial Commission has not been presented with 
enough evidence to reasonably infer what Mr. Mabbutt's 
job-related activities were the day of his death. Thus, the 
respondents have not met their burden of proof under the Allen 
test. 
VI. RESPONDENT HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF 
UNDER THE MEDICAL CAUSATION TEST OF ALLEN, 
AND IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO 
COMPENSATION. 
The findings of fact in the ALJ's February 28, 1988 
Order are clearly not supported by the evidence, but assuming 
arguendo that the ALJ's findings are correct, there is not 
sufficient medical causation in this case to award compensation 
to the applicant. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated, "[ulnder the medical cause test, the claimant must 
show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, 
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the result-
ing injury or disability. In the event the claimant cannot show 
a medical causal connection, compensation must be denied." 729 
P.2d at 27. The Allen case clearly places the burden of proving 
that the occupation led to the resulting injury squarely upon the 
claimant. 
In the instant case, all three medical doctors who 
testified, including Dr. Perry, the physician appointed by the 
Commission as the Medical Panel, Dr. Yanowitz, applicant's 
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expert, and Dr. Fowles, employer's expert, testified that Mr. 
Mabbutt's high-risk cardiac condition put Mabbutt at risk for a 
sudden heart attack at almost any time, while doing any activity, 
including sleeping. (See, Dr. Perry's testimony, p. 22, 
February 17, 1988 transcript; Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, p. 30, 
February 17, 1988 transcript; Dr. Fowles' testimony, p. 40, 
February 17, 1988 transcript.) All three medical doctors testi-
fied that Mr. Mabbutt could have had a heart attack while watch-
ing a football game on television. 
Additionally, all three medical doctors testified at 
the February 17, 1988 hearing that Mr. Mabbutt's work-related 
activities on the day of his death were a sufficient, but not a 
necessary precipitant of his death. (See, Dr. Perry's testimony, 
p. 23-24, February 17, 1988 transcript; Dr. Yanowitz's testimony, 
p. 37-38, February 17, 1988 transcript; Dr. Fowles' testimony, 
p. 39, February 17, 1988 transcript.) Because Mr. Mabbutt was at 
high risk for sudden cardiac death which, as the experts testi-
fied, could occur under any circumstances, the requisite medical 
causal connection required in Allen is not satisfied in this 
case. There would have to be evidence that in fact the 
work-related activities of the day of his death were indeed a 
necessary precipitant. Put another way, there would have to be 
medical evidence that "but for" his work-related activities on 
that day he would not have died. No expert was willing to 
testify in this matter that the work-related activities on the 
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day of his death were a necessary precipitant. They would only 
go so far as to say that his work-related activities were a 
sufficient precipitant. This quantum of medical proof simply 
does not satisfy the Allen standard. Thus, benefits must be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the improper inferences and findings that 
the ALJ made, which were neither reasonable nor supported by 
substantial evidence, the record is left with clear evidence of a 
worker who had a preexisting high-risk cardiac condition and no 
evidence with which to reasonably infer that Mr. Mabbutt engaged 
in unusual exertion at the critical time on the day of his death. 
For the foregoing reasons petitioners Price River Coal 
Company and CIGNA Insurance request that the Court review the 
Commission's May 23, 1988 decision denying petitioners' Motion 
for Review and determine that respondent Marie T. Mabbutt is not 
entitled to an award of compensation because respondents have 
failed to meet their burden of proof. 
DATED this )tf& day of September, 1988. 
tit***** 
M. EEEGANTE JAMES 
J. MICHAEL BAILEY 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners-
Defendants Price River Coal 
Company and CIGNA Insurance 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, 
by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann, S 63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings - Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or 
after the filing of any post-hearing papers permitted by the 
presiding officer, or within the time required by any applicable 
statute or rule of the agency, the presiding officer shall sign 
and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in 
the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding 
officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the 
agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or 
judicial review of the order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsider-
ation or review. 
